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Abstract
This article tests the pro-competitive effect of trade in the product and labour
markets of UK manufacturing sectors between 1988 and 2003 using a two-stage
estimation procedure. In the first stage, we use data on 11,799 firms from 20
manufacturing sectors to simultaneously estimate mark-up and workers’ bar-
gaining power parameters according to sector, firm size and period. We find a
significant drop in both the mark-up and the workers’ bargaining power in the
mid-1990s. In the second stage, we relate our parameters of interest to trade vari-
ables. Our results show that imports from developed countries have significantly
contributed to the decrease in both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power.
1. Introduction
Investigating the impact of foreign competition on price-marginal cost mark-
ups is a prominent topic in the trade literature. In particular for the UK,
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), Geroski (1981, 1982) and Conyon and Machin
(1991) show evidence of the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, that is,
the negative impact of foreign competition on mark-ups, using sector data.
Following Levinsohn’s 1993 JIE article, many firm-level studies have drawn
on Hall’s (1988) approach to estimate price-marginal cost mark-ups and have
provided support for the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis (see Har-
rison 1994; Kee and Hoekman 2007; Konings et al. 2001; Krishna and Mitra
1998 among others). However, Hall’s (1988) method relies on perfect labour
markets. Focusing on the labour side and inspired by Rodrik’s (1997) argu-
ment that increased international trade weakens the position of the workers,
only two studies (Brock and Dobbelaere 2006; Dumont et al. 2006) have
directly investigated whether stronger import competition squeezes workers’
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bargaining power.1 Dumont et al. (2006) find a negative impact using firm-
level data covering five European countries, whereas Brock and Dobbelaere
(2006) do not for Belgium. Using an extension of a microeconomic version of
Hall’s (1988) framework proposed by Crépon et al. (1999, 2002) to take into
account labour market imperfections, our main contribution is to provide
evidence of international competition curtailing domestic market power in
the product market as well as in the labour market for UK manufacturing
sectors. This is the first study that addresses both issues and that focuses on
the UK using firm-level data.2
Figure 1 displays the evolution in price-cost margins at the UK sector level
since 1970.3 At first sight, there is little evidence of a general decline in
price-cost margins despite a steady increase in openness. In fact, at the
aggregated manufacturing level, the price-cost margin was 9.4 per cent in
1970, 8.2 per cent in 1980, 11.5 per cent in 1990 and 9.2 per cent in 2003. How
could we reconcile these trends with the evidence of the pro-competitive effect
of international trade highlighted above? In short, the effect of trade on the
price-cost margin is not limited to its impact on the mark-up, because the
price-cost margin only captures the part of the rents kept by the firms.
Price-cost margins are therefore negatively related to the workers’ bargaining
power and a weakening of the workers’ bargaining power may counter-
balance, at least partly, a decrease in mark-ups.
Taking into account labour market imperfections, Borjas and Ramey
(1995) provide evidence of foreign competition exerting a negative impact on
wages by reducing rents in concentrated sectors. However, the finding of
lower rents per se does not mean that the rent-sharing scheme between capital
and labour has changed. The seminal article by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) draws attention to the importance of product and labour market
interactions. Moreover, OECD studies (e.g. Brandt et al. 2005) point out that
product and labour market deregulations are correlated across countries.
Going one step further, Ebell and Haefke (2006), endogenizing the bargain-
ing regime, argue that the strong decline in coverage and unionization in the
USA and the UK might have been a direct consequence of product market
reforms of the early 1980s. Boulhol (2009) develops a theoretical model
formalizing the idea that capital market and trade liberalization put pressure
on labour market institutions leading to deregulation. Studying the UK in
the 1980s and 1990s, Pencavel (2004) not only documents how the changes in
the legal and political framework were undoubtedly detrimental to unions,
but he also stressed that it is the context of fiercer product market competi-
tion which determined the impact of the new laws. Moreover, Hornstein
et al. (2005) suggest that, as union density did not fall in the public sector,
competitive pressure seems to be a reasonable cause of deunionization in the
UK. According to the empirical analysis herein, the trend in UK price-cost
margins is partially the result of the joint decline in the mark-up and the
workers’ bargaining power following the increased openness of the economy.
We contribute to the literature in different ways. We take advantage of a
rich firm-level dataset consisting of 11,799 firms in the UK manufacturing
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industry covering the period 1988–2003. This enables us to estimate mark-up
and workers’ bargaining power parameters simultaneously for 20 sectors
split according to 3 firm size categories and 3 time periods. To our knowl-
edge, investigating the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the two parameters at
this level of disaggregation has never been carried out for the UK. Whereas
previous empirical studies have tested the imports-as-market-discipline
hypothesis either on the product market or on the labour market, our study
bridges the gap by verifying the impact of increased import competition on
both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power parameters.
FIGURE 1
Price-Cost Margins for Large UK Manufacturing Sectors (Description in Table A1 in
Appendix A) — 1970–2003, STAN Database.
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We follow a two-stage approach in which we first estimate mark-ups and
workers’ bargaining power parameters according to three dimensions (sector,
firm size and time period). Our results point to a significant drop in both
parameters in the mid-1990s. In the second stage, we identify factors explain-
ing mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power with a special focus on inter-
national trade. We find clear evidence of imports from developed countries
having contributed significantly to the decline in both mark-ups and workers’
bargaining power.
In the remainder of the article, we first describe the theoretical framework
and the empirical strategy (Section 2). Section 3 concentrates on the first-
stage results. Section 4 discusses the second-stage results where we evaluate
the pro-competitive effect on both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
Theoretical Framework
Hall’s (1988) approach for evaluating mark-ups hinges on one crucial
assumption, that is, firms consider input prices as given prior to deciding their
level of inputs. In other words, there is no imperfection in the labour market.
However, there is widespread evidence of rent sharing, hence the need for a
framework to bring together imperfect competition in product and labour
markets. Theoretically, we rely on the model of Crépon et al. (1999, 2002),
detailed further by Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2008),
which extends Hall’s framework to allow for the possibility that wages and
employment are bargained over between firms and workers (efficient bar-
gaining).4 We start from a production function Qit = QitF(Nit, Mit, Kit), where
i is a firm index, t a time index, N is labour, M is material input, K is capital
and F(.) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in its arguments. Qit is
an index of technical change or ‘true’ total factor productivity (TFP). Denot-
ing the logarithm of Qit, Nit, Mit, Kit and Qit by qit, nit, mit, kit and qit, respec-
tively, the logarithmic differentiation of the production function gives:
Δ Δ Δ Δ Δq n m kit NQ it it M
Q
it it K
Q
it it it
= ( ) + ( ) + ( ) +ε ε ε θ (1)
where εJ
Q
it
J N M K( ) =( ), , is the elasticity of output with respect to input
factor J.
Each firm operates under imperfect competition in the product market.
On the labour side, we assume that the union and the firm are involved in
an efficient bargaining procedure with both wages (w) and labour (N) being
the subject of an agreement (McDonald and Solow 1981). The union’s
objective is to maximize U w N N v w N N v wit it it it it it it,( ) = ( ) + −( ) ( ) , where v(.)
is increasing and concave,5 Nit is union membership ( 0 < ≤N Nit it ), wit is
the alternative wage ( w wit it≤ ). Consistent with capital quasi-fixity,6 the
firm objective is to maximize its short-run profit function: p (wit, Nit,
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Mit) = Rit - witNit - jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue. The
outcome of the bargaining is the asymmetric Generalized Nash solution to:
max
, ,w N M
it it it it it it it it
it it it
itN v w N N v w N v w R( ) + −( ) ( ) − ( ){ } −φ w N j M
N v w v w
it it it it
w N M
it it it
it
it it it
i
−{ }
= ( ) − ( )( ){ }
−1 φ
φmax
, ,
t itR w N j Mit it it it it− −{ } −1 φ (2)
where fit ∈ [0, 1] represents the workers’ bargaining power.
We denote the marginal revenue of labour and the marginal revenue of
material input by (RN)it and (RM)it, respectively. Maximization with respect to
material input gives (RM)it = jit, which directly leads to:
ε μ αMQ it it M it( ) = ( ) (3)
where αM it
it it
it it
j M
P Q
( ) = is the share of material costs in total revenue.
μit
Q it
P
C
it
= ( ) refers to the mark-up of output price Pit over marginal cost (CQ)it.
Maximization with respect to employment and the wage rate gives the fol-
lowing first-order conditions, respectively:
w R
R w N j M
N
it N it
it
it
it it it it it
it
= ( ) +
−
− −⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
φ
φ1 (4)
v w v w
R w N j M
N
v wit it
it
it
it it it it it
it
it( ) = ( ) +
−
− −⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ ′ ( )
φ
φ1 (5)
Equation (5) states that the wage premium over the alternative wage is posi-
tively related to the workers’ bargaining power and to the size of the rents.
Solving simultaneously (4) and (5) leads to an expression for the contract
curve: w R v w v w
v wit N it
it it
it
− ( ) = ( ) − ( )
′ ( ) , which is positively sloped if workers
are risk-averse (v″ < 0) and vertical in the (N, w)-space if they are risk-
neutral. We denote the marginal revenue by (RQ)it and the marginal
product of labour by (QN)it. Expressing the marginal revenue of labour as
R R Q
P Q
N it Q it N it
it N it
it
( ) = ( ) ( ) = ( )μ and using this expression together with (4),
the elasticity of output with respect to employment can be written as:
ε μ α μ φφ α αN
Q
it it N it it
it
it
N it M it( ) = ( ) −
−
− ( ) − ( )[ ]
1
1 (6)
with αN it
it it
it it
w N
P Q
( ) = . Assuming constant returns to scale
ε ε εN
Q
it M
Q
it K
Q
it( ) + ( ) + ( ) =[ ]1 , the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
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ε μ α μ α μ φφ α αK
Q
it it M it it N it it
it
it
N it M it( ) = − ( ) − ( ) +
−
− ( ) − ( )[ ]1
1
1 (7)
Inserting (3), (6) and (7) in (1) and rearranging terms gives the following
expression for the Solow Residual SRit:
SR q n m kit it N it it M it it N it M it it
it
≡ − ( ) − ( ) − − ( ) − ( )[ ]
=
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ
α α α α
β
1
q k n kit it it N it M it it it it it−( ) − − ( ) − ( )[ ] −( ) + −( )Δ Δ Δ Δγ α α β θ1 1 (8)
where β μμit
it
it
=
−1
is the Lerner index and γ φφit
it
it
=
−1
, strictly increasing
functions of the mark-up and the bargaining power, respectively.
Equation (8) discriminates between the efficient bargaining model and the
right-to-manage model. In the right-to-manage model, although wages are
determined non-competitively, they are given before the firm’s employment
decision. Consequently, as in the perfect labour market case, the marginal
revenue of labour is equal to the wage, and firms stay on their labour demand
curve. Hence, the null hypothesis of git = 0 in Eqn (8) does not only corre-
spond to the assumption that the labour market is competitive but also to the
less restrictive assumption that firms and workers only bargain over wages in
a first step, and firms unilaterally determine their employment level in a
second step (right-to-manage assumption).
By embedding the efficient bargaining model into a microeconomic
version of Hall’s (1988) framework, the Solow Residual can be broken
down into three components: (1) a factor representing the Lerner index
(bit); (2) a factor reflecting the relative bargaining power of the workers (git);
and (3) a technological term (Dqit). Note that, as Dnit and Dqit are positively
correlated, the original Hall (1988) approach assuming allocative wages,
that is, neglecting the second term, generates a downward bias in estimated
mark-ups. Moreover, this bias increases with the bargaining power of the
workers, as it stems from the omission of the part of product rents captured
by the workers (see Crépon et al. 1999, 2002; Dobbelaere 2004; Dobbelaere
and Mairesse 2008 for evidence in the French and the Belgian manufactur-
ing industries).
Empirical Framework
To test the imports-as-product-and-labour-market-discipline hypothesis, we
follow a two-stage estimation strategy. In the first part, we estimate the
reduced form Eqn (8) which allows us to identify our structural parameters of
interest, that is, the price-marginal cost mark-up μˆ and the workers’ bar-
gaining power
φ . We estimate these parameters for 20 sectors in the UK
manufacturing industry, split according to 3 size categories and 3 time
periods. In the second part, our estimated parameters are regressed on inter-
national trade variables to test the hypothesis that international competition
curtails domestic product and labour market power.
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3. Part I: Identifying the parameters of interest μˆ and
φ
In this section, we first present the data. Second, we outline our empirical
strategy and compare consistently fixed effects (FE) and Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimates of our parameters of interest at the sectoral
level for all firms and all periods. Finally, we conduct a variance analysis
along the three dimensions, sector, firm size and period.
Data
Our analysis is based on two firm-level surveys: OneSource, which covers the
years 1988–1998, and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME), which offers
a coverage for the years 1994–2003.7 We end up with an unbalanced panel of
11,799 firms and 60,236 observations, with the average number of observa-
tions per firm being 7.8 The average number of workers is 475. The employ-
ment size is 58 for the first quartile of firms and 285 for firms in the upper
quartile. The median firm has 116 workers.
We use turnover deflated by the producer price index (PPI) at the four- and
five-digit level, according to availability,9 as a proxy for output (Q). Labour
(N) refers to the average number of employees in each firm for each year.
Intermediate inputs (M) are calculated by subtracting the value added from
the value of production, deflated by the two-digit materials and fuel price
index. The capital stock (K) is measured by the gross book value of fixed
assets deflated by a price index of net capital defined at the two-digit level. All
deflators are drawn from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). The
input shares (aN and aM) are computed by dividing respectively the firm total
labour cost and undeflated intermediate inputs by the value of production
and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years. Table 1 reports
the means, standard deviations, and first and third quartiles of our main
variables used in the Part I estimation.10
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Variables 1990–2003
Mean SD Q1 Q3
Real firm output growth rate Dq 0.015 0.167 -0.081 0.107
Labour growth rate Dn 0.003 0.129 -0.061 0.062
Capital growth rate Dk 0.007 0.179 -0.090 0.088
Intermediate inputs growth rate Dm 0.030 0.190 -0.084 0.139
Share of labour in nominal output aN 0.288 0.130 0.193 0.370
Share of intermediate inputs in nominal output aM 0.656 0.137 0.566 0.751
Solow Residual SRa 0.0009 0.080 -0.037 0.038
Dq - Dk 0.008 0.220 -0.116 0.137
(aN + aM - 1)(Dn - Dk) 0.0002 0.019 -0.005 0.005
Number of observations: 60,236.
aSR = Dq - aNDn - aMDm - (1 - aN - aM)Dk.
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We split the total sample into 20 two-digit sectors according to the Stan-
dard Industrial Classification 2003.11 Employment coverage of our sample is
on average 60 per cent of total UK manufacturing employment (SIC 15–37).
Table A1 in Appendix A shows the sector repartition of the sample.
Empirical Strategy
The main difficulty in estimating the extended Hall-type Eqn (8) lies in the
potential correlation between the TFP growth term (Dq) and the right-hand
side (RHS) variables. The problem arises because the productivity shocks are
unobserved by the econometrician but not necessarily by the firms which, at
least, might anticipate them before choosing their factor inputs. In this case,
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are likely to be biased. Moreover, the
burgeoning literature on firm heterogeneity stresses the differences in pro-
ductivity level and growth across firms (Bernard et al. 2003 for the USA and
Eaton et al. 2004 for France). As in Harrison (1994), this problem could be
addressed by decomposing the productivity growth term into a firm and a
time fixed effect, the latter capturing possible unobservable aggregate shocks
and productivity shocks common to all firms within sector j, plus a distur-
bance term:
u e e vijt j ijt ij jt ijt= −( ) = + +1 β θΔ (9)
However, since inputs and output are simultaneously determined, the FE
estimator might still be biased. Taking advantage of the panel dimension of
the data, Eqn (8) can be estimated using the GMM technique. We use
the three- to five-year lagged values of the factor inputs n, m and k as
instruments.
To estimate Eqn (8), firm-level variables are deflated by a common sector
price index. Output price differences between firms are hence not taken into
account and show up in the error term. This may give rise to downwardly
biased and inconsistent mark-up estimates if output price differences between
firms within a sector are endogenous and correlated with the explanatory
variables (changes in factor inputs and factor shares). To address this issue,
we adopt the solution suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996), which
amounts to adding the growth in sector output as an additional regressor.12
Because we include time dummies in our estimates run at the sector level, this
effect is being controlled for.
Comparison of FE and GMM Estimates
Table 2 reports the FE and GMM13 estimates for each of the 20 sectors.14 For
the GMM estimates, the parameters of interest ( μˆ j and
φ j, j = 1, . . . , 20)
are computed from the two-step estimated values of the reduced form
coefficients (
β j and γ j, respectively). The estimated standard errors ( σ ) of
the estimated parameters are computed using the Delta Method (Woolridge
2002).15
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The estimated Lerner index (
β j ) is always very significant. The estimated
relative bargaining power of the workers (
γ j ) is significant for 19 out of the
20 sectors with FE, and this number drops to 10 with GMM. However,
average parameters are very similar, around 0.20 for
β j and 0.70 for γ j ,
which implies an average estimated mark-up ( μˆ j ) of 1.25 and an average
estimated workers’ bargaining power parameter (
φ j ) of 0.40, respectively.
The latter is above Van Reenen’s (1996) estimates, lying in the 0.22–0.29
range, but is very close to the UK estimates obtained by Dumont et al. (2006)
using a smaller set of firms and sectors. More specifically, the FE range across
sectors is 1.12–1.45 for the estimated mark-up and 0.19–0.56 for the esti-
mated workers’ bargaining power. The GMM specification tests behave well.
The overidentification test is not rejected in all but two sectors. The autocor-
relation tests are not rejected for 16 sectors.
It is worth noting that the estimated mark-up ( μˆ j ) and the estimated
workers’ bargaining power parameters (
φ j ) are positively correlated across
sectors. The correlation between the two estimated structural parameters is
0.71 for the FE estimates and 0.53 for the GMM estimates. This is consistent
with the findings of Abowd and Lemieux (1993) that the bargaining power is
positively linked to the size of the rents, and with Dobbelaere (2004) and
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2008). Boulhol (2008) suggests that, as capital
return is determined by the share of the rents kept by the firms, an arbitrage
reasoning based on capital mobility across sectors can explain this positive
correlation.
Table 3 compares the FE and the GMM estimates more synthetically. The
trade-off between the two should be that GMM reduces the bias (see section
on Empirical Strategy) at the cost of less precise estimates. The results indi-
cate that the GMM estimates are more dispersed across sectors, even leading
to two (insignificant) negative bargaining power parameters. However, the
correlation between the FE and the GMM estimates is strong and significant.
For the estimated Lerner indexes, the Pearson correlation coefficient is close
to 0.90 between FE and GMM. For the estimated relative bargaining power
parameters, it reaches 0.57 unweighted and 0.72 when weighted to take into
TABLE 3
Correlation between FE and GMM Estimates
Mean SD Min Max Correlation FE-GMM
Unweighted Weight 1 Weight 2
β j FE 0.197 0.048 0.103 0.309 0.89*** 0.85*** 0.86***
GMM 0.208 0.069 0.076 0.390
γ j FE 0.723 0.298 0.238 1.289 0.57*** 0.72*** 0.71***
GMM 0.685 0.611 -0.302 1.679
Weight 1:
1
2σFE( )
, weight 2:
1
 
σ σFE GMM( )( )
.
*** Significant at 1%.
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account the precision of the estimates. All in all, as the average level of the
two parameters are very close with FE and GMM, the year and firm FE
specification seems to do a good job in accounting for the heterogeneity in
productivity growth across firms. Harrison (1994) shows that her FE and
instrumental variable (IV) estimates are very close and, consequently, sticks
to the FE results as Levinsohn (1993) does. We follow the same route for the
remainder of this study.
Variance Analysis
The above estimates should be considered as sectoral average parameters.
There are, however, many reasons to believe that mark-up and bargaining
power parameters vary across time and firm size. What follows confirms this
presumption. In addition to the sectoral dimension, the sample is split
according to size and period criteria. For the former, the sample is divided
between small firms (fewer than 75 employees on average), medium-sized
firms (between 75 and 200 employees) and large firms (more than 200
employees), which provides three subsamples of comparable size. For the
latter, three subperiods are defined: 1991–1994, 1995–1998 and 1999–2003.16
This leaves us with 179 estimates for the mark-up and the bargaining power
parameters: 20 sectors ¥ 3 periods ¥ 3 size classes, minus sector 19, first
period, small firms due to lack of data.
Before formally assessing the determinants of the two parameters of inter-
est, we conduct a variance analysis along the three dimensions presiding over
the splitting of the sample. Seventeen out of the 179 Part I estimates display
a negative estimated bargaining power and 2 out of the 179 Part I estimates
are estimated to be larger than 1. However, none of these 19 estimates are
estimated to be significant. As a robustness check, the various results are
compared with and without the 19 outliers.
As for the estimated mark-ups (see the left part of Table 4), the three
dimensions (sector, size and period) are very significant at the 99 per cent
confidence level, the sectoral dimension, as expected, accounting for the
larger part of the explained variance. Two findings show up clearly. First,
mark-ups drop significantly and importantly by around 7 percentage points
between the first and the second period. Second, the estimated mark-up is
increasing in firm size. This is consistent with both theory (e.g. Cournot
competition) and empirical evidence in the heterogeneous firm literature. The
difference according to firm size is especially true between the small firms and
the others.
The right part of Table 4 reports the variance analysis for the estimated
workers’ bargaining power parameters. The sector share of the explained
variance is also predominant. Similar to the estimated mark-up, the workers’
bargaining power dropped significantly, by around 0.12, after the first period.
This decrease in the workers’ bargaining power echoes Blanchflower and
Bryson (2004) who find a significant decline in the union wage premium after
1994 for the UK. It is also consistent with the diluted role of UK labour
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market institutions, documented by Machin (1997). In addition to other
legislative measures, he draws attention to the abolition of the Wages Council
system of minimum wages in August 1993, covering 2.5 million workers at
that time. Moreover, the workers’ bargaining power is estimated to be lower,
by around 0.05, for the smaller firms. However, this difference is only sig-
nificant with the medium-sized firms.17
4. Part II: Testing the imports-as-product-and-labour-market-discipline
hypothesis
This section concentrates on the identification of the effect of increased
import competition on both the estimated mark-ups and workers’ bargaining
power parameters. Since our dependent variables in the Part II estimations
are estimated in a first step, the first step (or sampling) variance must be taken
into account. Lewis and Linzer (2005) develop a Feasible Generalized Least
Squares estimator, EDV (Estimated Dependent Variable) that, compared to
OLS, corrects for both estimated parameter values and standard errors.
Lewis and Linzer (2005) show that EDV is more efficient than estimators that
correct for standard errors only.18 In addition, we cluster standard errors at
the sector-period level19 to deal with intra-cluster serial correlation, correla-
tion generated by common shocks, and all other forms of intra-cluster
TABLE 4
Variance Analysis
Mark-up μˆ jsp Bargaining power φˆ jsp
Period (ref: 1991–1994)
1995–1998 -0.070*** -0.120***
(0.024) (0.021)
1999–2003 -0.067** -0.126***
(0.025) (0.022)
Size (ref: small firms)
Medium-sized 0.050*** 0.055**
(0.014) (0.025)
Large 0.055*** 0.029
(0.016) (0.026)
Adj. R2 0.283 0.573
# Obs. 179 179
Share of explained variance
Sector 73%*** 71%***
Period 11%*** 26%***
Size 16%*** 3%**
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; they have been
corrected to account for the generated regressand problem
following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and clustered at the
sector-period level.
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%.
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correlation (Rogers 1993; Woolridge 2002). A description of all variables
used in this section and data sources are reported in Table A2 in Appendix A.
Our main focus is the impact of international trade on our two parameters of
interest.
Mark-up
(a) Specification
Firms under intensifying pressure from foreign competition are induced to
reduce their margins because of the increase in the perceived elasticity of the
demand they are facing. This elasticity depends on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between varieties, the concentration level and the intensity of
competition.
The following variables are defined. IMPORT is the share of imports in
sectoral demand. Trade theory highlights that the impact of imports is dif-
ferentiated depending on the origin of the imports. For a developed country
like the UK, trade with developing countries is supposedly based on com-
parative advantage and the impact of trade is mainly channelled through
reallocation between sectors. In contrast, trade with developed countries is
mostly intra-industry. It is based on imperfect competition and is therefore a
better candidate for the pro-competitive effect on mark-ups. We distinguish
IMPNORTH, which is the share of imports from Western Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in total demand, from
IMPSOUTH, its complement. Since firms are likely to select foreign markets
based on the margins they offer for their products, exports could be positively
related to mark-ups. The export ratio at the firm level is EXPFIRM.
When competition intensifies, firms’ reaction is not limited to pricing
behaviour. Sutton (1991, 1998) insists on the endogeneity of market struc-
ture. An increase in the competitive environment may trigger an endogenous
reaction of firms, through an increase in R&D or advertisement spending for
instance. This might force out firms that are unable to keep the pace. R&D
could hence be positively related to mark-ups. R&DRATIO is defined as the
share of R&D spending in total output at the sectoral level.
There is a lack of data to take into account the change in domestic com-
petition at the sectoral level. At the country level, we test three variables that
might have an impact on mark-ups. PMR is the product market regulation
index computed by the OECD on a scale from 0 to 6, in ascending order of
regulation. The series is available for 1988, 1993, 1998 (Nicoletti et al. 2001)
and 2003 (Conway et al. 2005), and is linearly interpolated between these
years.20 For the UK, it has decreased from 3.5 in 1988 to 1.0 in 2003. The
second variable is the (log of) stock market capitalization as a share of GDP,
CAPIT. Hoekman et al. (2001) argue that financial deepening reduces the
cost of capital, thus increasing the overall profitability of the economy. They
provide evidence of stock market capitalization exerting a significantly
positive impact on average sector mark-ups. Finally, the Herfindahl index,
HERF, is calculated from our sample. Caution is required using this variable
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as it is very sensitive to the entry or exit of big firms in the database at
different times.
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, an
abundant literature deals with the cyclicality of mark-ups. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) provide some detailed theoretical explanations, such as
overhead labour, adjustment costs and labour hoarding, in support of the
counter-cyclicality of mark-ups. The debate whether mark-ups are pro- or
counter-cyclical remains unresolved although the empirical evidence rather
leans towards counter-cyclicality. We use the annual change in value-added,
and VALUCYC is the de-trended series using a Hodrik–Prescott filter. Our
empirical specification can be expressed as:
μ α α α
ξ
jsp jp jsp x jsp j
s p j
Lag IMPORT Lag EXPFIRM X e
e e
= ( ) + ( ) + +
+ + +
1 2
sp (10)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
To account for the endogeneity problem of trade and other variables, all
explanatory variables are lagged, except for firm size, the cyclical variable
and the Herfindahl index. We use three-year lagged values of the endogenous
variables. In order to avoid overlapping between the subperiods, ideally we
would need five-year lags. However, such a long lag is likely to weaken the
explanatory power substantially and we therefore use it as a robustness
check only.
Appendix B provides some evidence that the import variable is related to
structural policy measures. In particular, there seems to be a positive relation
across sectors between the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio and the
expected impact of the 1992 Single Market Program. This is reassuring
because this means that the trade ratio seems to capture reasonably well the
major structural reforms that took place at the beginning of the period
under study.
(b) Results
The estimates are presented in Table 5. The main result is that imports exert
a negative impact on mark-ups, although this effect is not significant when
the origin of imports is not differentiated. As column (2) indicates, this is
because only imports from developed countries appear to have a significant
effect, which is consistent with the discussion above. The estimated impact
looks strong, as an increase of one point in the share of imports from the
North in total demand would trigger a decrease of around one point.
Exports never show up as being significant. Consistent with the heterog-
enous firm literature, we find that exports increase with firm size, as the
export ratio is on average 0.065 higher for the large compared to the small
firms. However, it seems that the size-effect on mark-ups is not amplified by
the export status.
When we substitute the (log of) average employment EMPL for the size
dummies or when the sample is restricted to the positive bargaining power
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observations, the results are not altered. When time dummies are withdrawn,
the coefficient of the cyclical variable VALUCYC is negative and significant
in two specifications, hence supporting the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups.
As a robustness check, we use five-year lags which produce in general
qualitatively similar — although not always significant – results. As an illus-
tration, we report in the last column the specification consistent with that in
column (2).
Workers’ Bargaining Power
(a) Specification
Formalizing the impact of foreign competition on workers’ bargaining
strength is not as straightforward as doing so on mark-ups, even if it is
generally reflected in the increase in the elasticity of labour demand due to
imports, for which Fabbri et al. (2003) provide some evidence for low-skilled
workers. Rodrik (1997) points out that imports increase the substitution
between domestic and foreign workers. Moreover, the possibility of offshor-
ing improves the position of employers in bargaining and at the same time
narrows the range of outside options available to workers. Therefore, pres-
sure from foreign competition could increase the risk of breakdown in bar-
gaining and loosen labour market tightness, thereby diminishing workers’
bargaining power (see Brock and Dobbelaere 2006; Dumont et al. 2006 for a
further discussion). Pencavel (2004) documents the surprising retreat of
union Britain. He details the changes in the legal framework for unionism
in the 1980s and 1990s and suggests that the context of a harsher domestic
and international competitive environment determined the impact of the
new laws.
In addition to the variables described in the Specification section, we
evaluate the effect of three labour market variables on workers’ bargaining
power: UNIONDENS, REPLRATE and UNEMPRATE, referring to
union density, the replacement rate and the unemployment rate at the
country level, respectively. Union density and the replacement rate are
expected to be positively related to the workers’ bargaining power, as
shown by Conyon and Machin (1991) and Karier (1985). For the unem-
ployment rate, the link might not be clear-cut. An increase in the unem-
ployment rate has a negative effect on the outside option, hence a negative
relationship with the workers’ bargaining power is expected. However,
because the union wage premium softens the impact of shocks on wages,
Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) find that the union wage premium is
counter-cyclical, pointing to a positive relationship. Therefore, the resulting
effect is, a priori, ambiguous.
Product market deregulation (PMR) has been found to be positively cor-
related to labour market deregulation across countries and seems to precede
labour market reforms (see figure 34 in Brandt et al. 2005). If capital deep-
ening (CAPIT) is linked to increased capital mobility, it might have a nega-
tive impact on the workers’ bargaining power. Finally, it is often argued that
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technological change, instead of international trade, triggers changes in the
labour market (see e.g. Berman et al. 1994; Krugman and Lawrence 1996).
Technological change (R&DRATIO) might exert an effect on the workers’
bargaining power by impacting the nature of the production process.
However, this effect is, a priori, unclear. As discussed in Betcherman (1991),
it depends on the importance of labour costs in the firm’s total costs and on
the workers’ essentiality in the production process.
Finally, concentration (HERF) can have two opposite effects on the bar-
gaining power. On the one hand, in concentrated sectors, firms may tend to
have monopsony power in the labour market, which weakens the workers’
bargaining power. On the other hand, as argued by Veugelers (1989), output
concentration may allow firms to shift costs on to customers more easily and
accept stronger unions. Ebell and Haefke (2006) find a positive correlation
between concentration and union coverage in a cross-section of US sectors.
To test the imports-as-labour-market discipline hypothesis, we estimate
the following specification:
φ α α α
ξ
jsp jp jsp x jsp j
s p j
Lag IMPORT Lag EXPFIRM X e
e e
= ( ) + ( ) + +
+ + +
1 2
sp (11)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
(b) Results
Our results, which are reported in Table 6, provide robust evidence of
imports from developed countries having squeezed the workers’ bargaining
power. Total imports is also significant but this is only due to the effect of
imports from developed countries. An increase of one point in the share of
imports from the North seems to have reduced the bargaining power by 0.008
on average.21 The fact that only increased import competition from the North
exerts a significantly negative impact might seem surprising at first sight.
However, one would need to rely on a more detailed skill structure within
sectors to have a clearer analysis. Our results seem to indicate that, because
of similar characteristics in terms of education, productivity and skills,
foreign workers in developed countries are more substitutable through
imports to UK workers than those in developing countries. Interestingly,
Neven and Wyplosz (1999) find similar effects. Also, Greenaway et al. (1999)
study the impact of international trade on UK employment between 1979
and 1991. They find that only imports from developed countries had a
negative impact, which is even more surprising, and suggest that the com-
petition from developing countries is in sectors that had already declined
in the 1970s.
The coefficient on EXPFIRM is positive and significant at 10 per cent in
three specifications. Because most of the other explanatory variables lack the
sectoral dimension, we run into severe multicollinearity issues. This makes it
almost impossible to disentangle the effect of these country variables. There-
fore, we test each of them separately, keeping in mind that the contribution
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of each variable should not be cumulated. The impact of UNIONDENS,
PMR, REPLRATE, CAPIT and UNEMPRATE show up significantly. The
first two variables have the highest explanatory power. Deunionization seems
to be associated with a decline in the workers’ bargaining power between
1991 and 2003. Product market and labour market deregulation are found to
go hand in hand. A higher unemployment rate, a lower replacement rate
and financial deepening seem negatively related to the workers’ bargaining
power. Finally, the workers’ bargaining power is found to be significantly
higher in concentrated sectors whereas no significant relationship is detected
with R&D.22
Product Market versus Labour Market Discipline and the Price-Cost
Margin Puzzle
What is the significance of both the mark-up and the bargaining power
sensitivities to imports in relation to the overall findings in Figure 1 high-
lighting that price-cost margins are about the same? Based on the model in
Methodology, the price-cost margin, PCM, is derived from Eqn (7) which is
rewritten as:
α α
ε φ
μ
φ α α
ε
μ
φ
N M
K
Q
N M
K
Q
PCM+ =
−( ) −( )
+ ⇒ ≡ − −
= −
−⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −( )
1 1
1
1
1
1 (12)
Differentiation of Eqn (12) implies Δ Δ ΔPCM
PCM
K
Q
K
Q=
−( )
−
−( ) − −
1
1
1 1
ε
μ
ε
μ
μ
μ
φ
φ
Using the expression of 1−( )ε
μ
K
Q
implied by Eqn (12) leads to
Δ Δ ΔPCM PCM PCM= − − −
−
1
1
φ
μ
μ φ φ.
Focusing on the effect of imports, the impact on the price-cost margin can
be broken down into two components, the product-market-discipline effect
and the labour-market-discipline effect:
∂
∂
=
− − ∂
∂
−
−
∂
∂
PCM
IMPNORTH
PCM
IMPNORTH
PCM
IMPNORTH
1
1
φ
μ
μ
φ
φ
Based on the average estimates in Table 2 and Figure 1 (m = 1.25, f = 0.40,
PCM = 0.14), the order of magnitude of the impact of imports from devel-
oped countries on the price-cost margin is given by:
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∂
∂ =
∂
∂ −
∂
∂
PCM
IMPNORTH IMPNORTH IMPNORTH
0 37 0 23. .
μ φ
The average estimates in Tables 5 and 6 give
∂
∂ ≈ −
∂
∂ ≈ −
μ φ
IMPNORTH IMPNORTH
1 0 0 8. .and , which leads to the fol-
lowing breakdown:
ΔPCM = +product-market-discipline effect labour-market-discipline effect
= − +0 37 0 19. .Δ ΔIMPNORTH IMPNORTH
This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that first, the labour-
market discipline effect might have counteracted half of the product-market
discipline effect and second, that import competition has contributed to a
decline in the price-cost margin of around 1 percentage point on average over
the period.23 The puzzle is therefore only partially resolved.
5. Conclusion
Many empirical studies have provided evidence that trade has a pro-
competitive effect by reducing mark-ups to marginal cost in import compet-
ing sectors. Most have focused on developing countries assuming a perfectly
competitive labour market. In contrast, this study concentrates on a devel-
oped country and takes into account labour market imperfections, using
firm-level data for UK manufacturing sectors. Our results indicate that both
the mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power decreased in the mid-1990s.
Moreover, imports from developed countries are shown to contribute signifi-
cantly to these changes, whereas firm exports have a weakly significant
positive influence on the workers’ bargaining power. These joint effects imply
that trade has exerted a conflicting impact on price-cost margins, that is, on
the share of the rents kept by the firms. Based on the estimates, the labour-
market-discipline effect might have counteracted half of the product-market-
discipline effect. We also find, consistent with the recent literature on firm
heterogeneity, that small firms have lower mark-ups. Additionally, their
workers are subject to a lower bargaining power.
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Notes
1. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) showed indirectly that foreign competition has
an impact on workers’ bargaining power by first, linking the size of the rents
to foreign competition and second, the bargaining power to the size of the
rents.
2. Dumont et al. (2006) include the UK among the five countries but their sample is
much smaller and they focus on the labour market only.
3. Price-cost margin is defined, as in Schmalensee (1989: 960), as the difference
between revenue and variable cost over revenue. The variable cost is the sum of
the costs of variable inputs, that is, labour and materials.
4. One popular alternative to Hall’s methodology is that developed by Roeger
(1995). Unfortunately in our precise context, on top of the usual limitations
referring either to the intricate computation of the user cost of capital or the
assumption of perfect adjustment of capital, Roeger’s specification requires
mark-ups to be constant over time, an assumption which is obviously inconsistent
with the very purpose of this study. In addition, when introducing labour market
imperfections, for example with efficient bargaining, the derived specification
(even if one assumes time-invariant parameters) cannot identify separately the
mark-up and the bargaining power.
5. Crépon et al. (1999, 2002) assume that workers are risk-neutral. We use a more
general framework.
6. Crépon et al. (1999, 2002) assume capital quasi-fixity. In their framework, what
matters is only that capital is installed before bargaining takes place, which is a
very reasonable hypothesis.
7. OneSource is a database of company accounts constructed by OneSource Infor-
mation Services Ltd, while FAME is gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing, and both derive ultimately from the information which companies are
required to deposit at Companies House. For FAME, a maximum of 10 years of
complete data history can be downloaded at once. For OneSource, we used the
CD-ROM entitled UK companies, Vol. 1, October 2000. Further details on the
OneSource dataset can be found in Oulton (1998).
8. In OneSource, the holding companies are reported in addition to their subsidiar-
ies. To avoid double accounting, we excluded the holdings.
9. The PPI is available at the five-digit level for the period 1990–2000 and at the
four-digit level for the period 2001–2003.
10. We made two rounds of cleaning: the first in order to harmonize OneSource with
FAME and to obtain a unique and coherent dataset, and the second to eliminate
outliers and anomalies in the dataset. Details are available upon request.
11. We paid attention to the fact that some firms were recorded in two sectors at
different times. To create a one-to-one match between firms and sectors, each firm
was attributed to the most recorded sector. Sectors 16 and 23 have been dropped
due to parsimonious data.
12. Theoretically, this solution relies on the assumption that the market power of
firms originates from product differentiation. Intuitively, in the case of product
differentiation, the demand for an individual firm’s products is a function of its
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relative price within the sector. Relative price differences can then be expressed in
terms of relative output growth differences in the sector.
13. The GMM estimation was carried out in Stata 9.1 (Roodman 2005).
14. Note that a considerable share of firms generates negative profits in a given year.
For instance, the sum of the shares of variable factors in output exceeds 1 for 21
per cent of the observations in our sample, which is not uncommon. In this case,
Eqn (8) is not symmetrical as bargaining does not apply to negative profits. In
particular, wages cannot be lower than the marginal revenue of labour. It follows
directly that [1 - (aN)it - (aM)it](Dnit - Dkit) in Eqn (8) equals zero when the sum of
the variable input shares exceeds one.
15. σ
σ
β
σ
σ
γμ
β
φ
γ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
;
ˆ
.=
−( ) = +( )1 12 2
16. We start in 1991 to allow for lags.
17. Dropping the 19 estimated bargaining power parameters that are outside the [0,1]
range leads to very similar results.
18. Dumont et al. (2005) propose a corrected OLS estimator that provides a proce-
dure to correct for estimated standard errors only and that is unbiased even in
small samples. However, when the sampling variance is large, the loss in efficiency
compared to EDV could be important. Besides, Lewis and Linzer (2005) report
that their EDV estimated standard errors show little to no bias even in samples as
small as 30 observations. As a check, we nevertheless implemented the Dumont
et al. (2005) procedure, which led to similar inferences to those drawn from the
results presented below. The main difference refers to the point estimates when
the bargaining power is the dependent variable, which suggests that the sampling
variance plays a greater role in that case.
19. Since our key variable of interest, imports, varies at the sector-period level only,
we cluster standard errors at that level (see below).
20. The indicator is based on seven non-manufacturing sectors (energy, communica-
tion and transport). It is very correlated (linear coefficient of around 86 per cent)
to the regulation index for the whole economy, only available for 1998 and 2003.
21. Considering five EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK),
Dumont et al. (2006) find a comparable effect.
22. As a robustness check, limiting ourselves to the 160 bargaining power Part I
estimates lying in the [0,1] interval produces similar results. Also, we used a
logit transformation. The results are presented in Table A3 in Appendix A. As
can be seen, the orders of magnitude are comparable but the logit specification
leads to less significant estimates. When the bargaining power is the dependent
variable, the average parameter on DIMPNORTH is around -0.80,
that is, Df ª -0.80DIMPNORTH. With the logit specification, the average
DIMPNORTH parameter is around -3.0 from which we infer:
Δ Δ Δ Δln . .φφ φ φ φ1 3 0 3 0 1−( ) ≈ − ⇔ ≈ − −( )IMPNORTH IMPNORTH. The aver-
age estimated bargaining power is around 0.40 (Table 2), hence an average sen-
sitivity of -3 ¥ 0.4 ¥ 0.6 = -0.72. Of course, from the logit specification, the
implied sensitivity to IMPNORTH depends on the level of the bargaining power.
One can calculate that this sensitivity is equal to -0.27 when the bargaining power
is 0.10 and -0.63 when it is 0.70.
23. IMPNORTH has increased by 6 percentage points on average over the total
period and (-0.37 + 0.19)0.06 ª -0.01.
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Appendix A: Statistical Annex
TABLE A1
Sector Repartition of the Sample
Code Name
15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing, dying of fur
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Printing and publishing
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36 Manufacturing, n.e.c.
TABLE A2
Description and Source of Variables in Part II Regressions
Variable Description Source
CAPIT Log of stock market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP
Datastream
EMPL Log of firm average employment level
across the whole period
OneSource, FAME
EXPFIRM Firm exports/turnover ratio OneSource, FAME
HERF Sample-based Herfindahl index OneSource, FAME
IMPORT Sectoral import penetration ratio:
imports/(imports + production - exports)
STAN
IMPNORTH IMPORT from Western Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand
Bilateral Trade Database
(OECD)
IMPSOUTH Complement of IMPNORTH Bilateral Trade Database
(OECD)
PMR Product market regulation index Conway et al. (2005),
Nicoletti et al. (2001)
R&DRATIO Sectoral share of R&D expenses in total
output
OECD
UNEMPRATE Country-level unemployment rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
UNIONDENS Manufacturing-level union density Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
REPLRATE Manufacturing-level replacement rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
VALUCYC De-trended sectoral annual change in
value added
STAN
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Appendix B: 1992 Single Market Program
In order to address the endogeneity issue related to the trade variables, some
empirical studies (e.g. Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001; Griffith 2001) have used
a criterion suggested by the European Commission. Sectors were grouped
according to the level of non-tariff barriers that the 1992 Single Market
Program (SMP) was expected to reduce. Based on this criterion, sectors were
classified as having a high, moderate or low sensitivity to the SMP (Buigues
et al. 1990). Out of 120 NACE three-digit manufacturing sectors, 14 were
classified as highly sensitive and 26 as moderately sensitive to the SMP. There
is one major difficulty in applying such a strategy here. In order to identify
the structural parameters of interest, the mark-up and bargaining power,
the level of aggregation is two-digit and, for a given two-digit sector, the
corresponding three-digit components generally fall in different sensitivity
categories.
However, even though the match is far from perfect, the two-digit sectors
were tentatively classified according to their sensitivity level, as displayed in
Table B1. Sectors are ranked based on the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio
in column 2. Column 3 reports the apparent break in the series based on
Figure B1, that is, the year where imports from developed countries have
accelerated. The average increase in IMPNORTH, which is reported in
Table A3 in Appendix A, is entirely explained by 9 out of the 20 sectors, 7 of
which saw an acceleration in IMPNORTH just after the completion of the
SMP. Moreover, the sensitivity to the SMP reported in the fourth column of
Table B1 indicates that there is a fairly clear relation between the increase in
imports from developed countries and the expected sensitivity to the SMP.
This is reassuring because this means that the trade ratio seems to capture
reasonably well the major structural reforms that took place at the beginning
of the period under study.
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FIGURE B1
Share of UK Imports from Developed Countries in Sectoral Demand, Two-digit
Manufacturing Sectors, OECD Database.
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
_15 _17 _18
_19 _20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
_21 _22 _24
_25 _26
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
_27 _28 _29
_30 _31
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
_32 _33 _34
_35 _36
Imports as Market Discipline 361
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2009.
